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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and their aftermath effects on the world 
economy have underlined vulnerabilities faced by developing countries and industrialized countries alike in a 
globalizing world.  The attacks were undertaken by groups embedded in communities across the world, capable 
of using passenger aircraft and pathogens to wreak havoc within and across borders. Overnight US national 
security acquired a more global dimension and a new coalition-building impetus. So too global public health 
and the international pharmaceutical industry have sprung into the limelight with the spectre of anthrax 
spreading in and possibly outside of the US.  Industrialized countries have found themselves in need of large 
preventive supplies of an antibiotic produced under patent by one large pharmaceutical company, forcing many 
to reassess the trade-related intellectual property rights regime that has been pushed in the WTO (FT 
23/10/2001). 
 
Globalization has deepened interdependence in global security, health, politics, and the world economy. It has 
also heightened expectations of global governance. Globalization has become an inflammatory issue. Some 
believe it brings modernization, growth and opportunities, but many others point to those who marginalized or 
who have been left dissatisfied by the process. Increasing public anxiety and doubt has been expressed in large-
scale anti-globalization demonstrations surrounding major meetings of international economic and 
environmental organizations. Governments themselves have focussed more than ever before on how better to 
manage globalization. They have been assisted by a slew of expert commissions looking into the question (see 
UN 2001, IFIAC 2000, Ford Foundation 2001).   
 
What has become clear is that global institutions and rules are failing to provide solutions to problems which 
markets cannot resolve. This includes problems of equity and justice at the international level. The argument for 
including justice and equity in any definition of public goods is reflected in the constitutions of countless 
agencies created in the wake of the second world war. The ILO constitution proclaims that`universal and lasting 
peace can be established only if it is based on social justice’ and that `the failure of any nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their 
own countries’.  Similarly we find that the WHO constitution not only declares that the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is a fundamental right of all human beings, but also argues that health is 
`fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest cooperation of 
individuals and states’. In modern parlance, both these constitutions are arguing for the provision of public 
goods including equity and justice within and among states. 
 
Even within the more explicitly market-oriented institutions we find enjoinments to ensure equity among and 
within member states. As regards trade the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank are all constitutionally enjoined 
not just to facilitate trade but to facilitate balanced growth in international trade among their members. Equally 
importantly, all three have as a core purpose the maintenance or attainment of high standards of living within all 
member countries. 
 
Yet in 2002 there is an inadequate supply of international public goods (Kanbur et al 1999). At the same time, 
the problems which need managing are multiplying with increased market transactions, population pressures, 
the unintended consequences of new technologies, and the break-up of nations.  
 
People within developing countries are particularly adversely affected by failures at the international level to 
ensure a number of crucial public goods.  One key example is the need to apply trade liberalization rules 
consistently so as to apply to those products which developing countries produce such as agriculture and 
textiles. It also means restraining the protectionist abuse in industrialized countries of anti-dumping measures 
and the like. Another key public good is basic research on vaccines and treatments against vector-borne and 
other infectious diseases. Malaria alone kills roughly twice as many people worldwide as AIDS and 
disproportionately affects people in developing countries. In the fifties the WHO aimed to eradicate the disease. 
Yet in 2002 it attracts very little public funding for research or treatment and kills about 2.7 million people per 
year worldwide and sickens as many as half a billion.  
 
Other examples of the failure to provide public goods include the absence of:  
- adequate mechanisms permitting governments to resolve debt repayments crises in an orderly way;  
- international coordinated measures which would enhance international financial and exchange rate 
stability;  HDR 2002, Background Paper by Ngaire Woods, page 4 
 
- institutions to dampen the counter-cyclical tendencies of global capital markets and `contagion’ which 
disproportionately affects developing countries due to less resilient local financial markets and more 
wary local and foreign creditors;  
- effective action to slow global warming and protection of the ozone layer; 
- preventive measures to maintain regional peace and security and to uphold international law; 
- the protection of refugees and prevention of forced migration.  
Yet those who are most adversely affected are virtually invisible in global governance arrangements.  
 
 
Box 1: Failure to provide global public goods and the impact on developing countries 
 
Unfair trade: It has been estimated that developing countries lose [$x million] per year due to trade 
protectionism in the industrialized world. This represents  [x] times the total amount of debt relief presently 
being offered. (Cite UNCTAD report) 
 
Little work on malaria: give WHO estimates, [x] per year die of Malaria, [$x million] is spent per year in 
research and treatment. This represents [x%] of spending on [comparable]. 
 
No debt resolution mechanism: [x] countries are presently indebted to the tune of [x%] of their GDP. A 
large portion of this debt has been incurred as countries roll over and reschedule debts from previous regimes 
and eras. The continuing growth of a debt overhang underscores the lack of an effective procedure and 
mechanism at the international level to permit the writing down of unsustainable debt in an orderly way, 
adjudicating among the claims of international financial institutions, governments and private sector 
investors.  
 
Reduction of vulnerabilities to international capital markets: 
 
Global warming and ozone depletion: Global warming and ozone depletion are estimated to impact on 
people in developing countries.. [give figures from UNEP] 
 
Prevention and protection of refugees: give UNHCR estimates [x] per year... Virtually all are from 
developing countries and moving to developing countries. 
 
The actors involved in global governance are not just governments. Recent financial and security crises 
highlight a host of other actors. In international finance we find banks, investment houses, security brokerages, 
hedge funds and asset managers are lobbyists and participants in the debate about how to govern (or leave to the 
markets) the global financial system. Similarly in global environmental negotiations we find large energy 
corporations. In global health policy we find pharmaceutical companies. On each issue we also find a host of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Global governance creates an international arena for lobbying, 
representation and self-regulation not just among states but also among powerful private sector actors and 
NGOs.  
 
The term global governance is contested at best. Some would say that the very term obscures more than it 
describes, proposing or assuming a `global community’ which does not really exist and a form of management 
or government that is not really about governing (Streeten 2001). For this reason some clear definitions are in 
order. Global governance is here used to refer to the institutions, organizations, networks and processes 
generated by global actors in order to guide and restrain the behaviour of themselves and others in both national 
and international domains. These global actors include governments and multilateral or inter-state organizations, 
private sector actors who organize and undertake their commercial activities on a global basis, and non-
governmental organizations whose membership, values, issues, organization or actions have a transnational or 
supraterritorial element.  Global governance is a broader term than `global government’ which suggests a 
centralized authority capable of creating formal obligations without the explicit consent of affected states and 
other parties.  
 
Accountability in global governance is about information, monitoring, and the enforcement of limits and rules in 
the use of power. Accountability addresses ways in which dissatisfied or disenfranchised groups who are deeply 
affected by global governance can call those who exercise power to account, whether in the public or private HDR 2002, Background Paper by Ngaire Woods, page 5 
 
sector.  Within democratic political systems this is achieved through elections, ombudsmen, court actions, non-
governmental agencies, and the media.  In global governance, no actor can claim to have been elected by voters. 
Nor are many institutions subject to the normal restraints or checks and balances of public office. Multilateral 
organizations grapple with an unwieldy structure of government representation which makes accountability 
complex and difficult. Private corporations face even fewer, mostly self-imposed restraints. Non-governmental 
organizations set standards for other actors and play a vital role in monitoring performance, yet their critics 
argue that they themselves are not adequately held to account.  
 
The past few years have witnesses an increasing demand for accountability at the international level. This desire 
for more accountable global governance has been sparked by a number of recent trends. Global governance 
itself has mushroomed as governments call upon international organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World 
Bank, the WTO to take on broader, deeper roles in ensuring stability, growth, and security within as well as 
among states. Large corporations are organizing not just their commercial activities but also their lobbying and 
self-regulation at a global level so as better to protect their transnational activities and opportunities. Non-
governmental organizations are spreading further afield (and delving deeper within fields) to monitor and 
publicize the activities of other global actors.  In brief, the twenty-first century brings us more global actors, 
processes and issues, and a growing public anxiety about who is governing and at whose behest at the global 
level? 
 
The implications for development are profound.  Within the boundaries of the state people have at least enjoyed 
a potential to hold their governments to account, as described above through elections, impartial courts, 
ombudsmen, the media and such like.  Yet increasingly, governments are delegating or ceding control over such 
decisions to international organizations, networks or other actors.  This means that even in democracies, 
governments cannot be held to account for a widening range of decisions.  
 
In the industrialized world the accountability gap is being partially plugged by an ever-expanding number of 
NGOs and active investigative media attention, not only on domestic issues but increasingly targeted at 
international actors.  Government agencies, international organizations, and large corporations such as BP, Shell 
and De Beers have all found themselves the targets of uncomfortable scrutiny. In the public sector, consumers, 
parents, and patients are being offered more information and choice about products, schools and hospitals. 
Indeed, there is even an emerging debate about the downside of `too much accountability’ by people in 
industrialized countries wearied by what seems an excess of monitoring, reporting and measuring outputs in 
public services.  
 
Little of this is true for developing countries. The gaps in accountability at the national level have been explored 
in other parts of this report. In global governance, accountability to people in developing countries is equally 
poor. In international organizations, developing country governments have little power and influence to wield in 
holding these agencies to account. Furthermore, their own actions in these organizations are less monitored by 
their own national media and NGOs.  In the global private sector, in new public-private expert networks and in 
`global civil society’, developing countries have even less capacity to hold global actors to account. For these 
reasons, accountability in global governance and its implications for development need rethinking. 
 
1. Who should be held to account in global governance? 
 
Traditionally global governance has been concerned with formal multilateral organizations.  Today however, 
global governance is more accurately described as a burgeoning array of institutions, networks, coalitions and 
informal arrangements many of which lie a little further beyond the public gaze and the direct control of 
governments.  
 
There are at least five trends emerging in patterns of global governance, each of which is examined in this 
section. Most recently visible is the trend towards holding governments and regimes to account at the 
international level for their actions within their own borders. The second is the expansion of activities of 
international organizations, beyond facilitating and regulating relations among states and into directly affecting 
the lives of groups within developing countries. The third is the rise of more global private sector forms of self-
regulation and governance. The fourth is the growth and activities of non-governmental organizations. The fifth 
and final trend is towards more `expert’ or `independent’ institutions of governance.   
 
In each sub-section below these new forms of governance are analysed. In each case the capacity for less HDR 2002, Background Paper by Ngaire Woods, page 6 
 
privileged people and countries to hold institutions to account is examined.  
 
1.1 Governments and regimes 
 
[A section on this should draw on Richard Falk’s work on international and transnational law.  It needs to 
highlight the capacity (and limits) of international law in holding governments and regimes to account. The 
most pertinent and clearest example is should be the inability to uphold international law (including the Geneva 
Conventions and UNSC Resolutions) in respect of Palestinian people- this should be a box.  
 
The new situation - the `holding to account’ of the Taliban regime for actions of people within its borders needs 
to be examined with the possibilities as well as problems that it raises]. 
 
1.2 International organizations 
 
Over the past two decades globalization has drawn more actors into an interdependent world which requires 
regulation or management. The financial crisis in East Asia 1997 revealed that events in Thailand were capable 
of sparking what the IMF called a `currency meltdown’ across East Asia, catalysing a collapse of the rouble in 
Russia in 1998 which in turn brought down the US hedge fund Long Term Capital Management which in turn 
threatened the largest banks in the USA. The crisis showed that global markets could not be left to their own 
devices without jeopardizing economic, political and social stability in several corners of the world.  
Government and multilateral intervention was necessary but sparked a debate about who should bear the cost? 
The answers to this question underpin core issues at stake in global governance. 
 
In resolving the East Asian crisis and its aftermath, policy-makers had to address whether investors would lose 
their money or be bailed out to prevent a spreading crisis. If investors were bailed out, who would pay for the 
resources needed to bail them out?  Would it end up being the workers and the poor across East Asia who had 
already been devastated by the crisis?  The intervention in East Asia produced a sharp debate about the role and 
the accountability of international economic institutions in such crises (see Feldstein 1999). This is reflected in 
the ongoing debate about the need for a more effective and equitable mechanism for ensuring that all parties to 
debt crises share an appropriate portion of the burden.  
 
[Box 1. Governing financial crises: public and private sector burdens] 
 
Alongside the new vulnerability of all states to global crises, there has been a tangible expansion of inter-
governmental decision-making into areas previously considered the preserve of national governments. This is 
most obvious in the current debate about the future government of Afghanistan and what role international 
organizations should play in shaping this (www.un.org/News/ossg/). Other examples lie in the way international 
organizations have come to work on issues within states such as security, human rights, corruption, poverty, and 
gender inequality. Whereas previously decisions in these areas were made at the national level and people could 
hold their national governments to account for policies, they must now look to multilateral organizations in 
which the question of who is making decisions and to whom they are accountable is less clear.  
 
This trend towards delegating more decisions to international organizations is, if anything, accelerating.  In 
response to various crises in the 1990s, high-level policy-makers and academics have offered a slew of 
proposals for creating yet more multilateral agencies in the hope that they will provide solutions to the new 
vulnerabilities created by globalization. These include proposals for a Global Environment Organisation (UN 
2001), a global bankruptcy mechanism (EMEPG 2000, Raffer 1993), a global financial regulator (Eatwell 
2000), an International Tax Organization (UN 2001), and an Economic Security Council (Stewart and Daws 
2000, UN 2001). Yet at the same time, multilateral organizations face two distinct problems in the 
contemporary world: the inadequate commitment of powerful member governments, and the disillusionment of 
weaker states and also of civil society, as reflected on the streets surrounding any international meeting on the 
global economy or environment. 
 
(a) the lack of commitment of powerful governments 
 
Not all governments accept that their interests are best pursued through multilateral agencies such as the IMF, 
the World Bank or the UN Security Council and nor do these institutions have authority over all global actors.  
Developing and emerging countries have long argued that they are under-represented and ill-served by HDR 2002, Background Paper by Ngaire Woods, page 7 
 
organizations which too often act like `rich men’s clubs’. Such criticisms are being magnified as the institutions 
intervene more heavily in developing countries.  Yet these states tend to continue to participate and commit to 
the processes and outcomes of multilateralism.  
 
A greater threat to international organizations comes from powerful states who, even as they advocate 
multilateralism as the necessary correlate of globalization, are prone to `shopping around’ for the arena in which 
they can best achieve their ends. Sometimes this means turning their back on multilateralism and pursuing their 
goals through private-public alliances, `coalitions of the willing’, or regional or unilateral means. This creates a 
sense of injustice on the part of countries and groups required to `play by the multilateral rules’, without a 
capacity either to set those rules or to avoid them.  
 
In this regard, the US has special power and influence.  It is perceived to exercise power and influence within 
international organizations much greater than its formal voting power or contribution to the resources of 
organizations.  In large part this is because it has a range of alternatives and is virtually the only state in the 
system which can therefore choose on individual issues to take or leave multilateralism. This is worth 
illustrating. US trade policy offers an example. Although the US has pushed for a new trade round within the 
framework of the World Trade Organization, it can also seek to forge agreements with countries individually or 
in groups which better reflect the US desiderata.   
 
In bilateral negotiations, one example is the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement which was signed on 24 October 
2000, eliminating duties and commercial barries to bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the United 
States and Jordan (USTR 2000). The agreement includes requirements which go well beyond what the US has 
managed to insert into the WTO agreements. The US-Jordan FTA includes provisions on intellectual property 
right protection, trade and the environment, labour, and electronic commerce and side letters concerning 
marketing approval for pharmaceutical products, and trade in services. In essence, the US-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement sets an example of how the US might achieve its trade goals without recourse to multilateral 
institutions. However, there is a real limit to this strategy for it relies on such bilateral agreements with the 
United States becoming more widespread. With the exception of agreements with Singapore and Chile and 
within NAFTA, there is little evidence to date that this is the case.  
 
A different alternative for the United States is illustrated by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The 
proposed agreement covers 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere and extends across nine issues: market 
access, agriculture, services, investment, intellectual property, government procurement, subsidies, 
antidumping, countervailing duties, competition policy, and dispute settlement. http://www.ustr.gov Like the 
US-Jordan Trade Agreement, the FTAA includes a number of issues which the US has been unable to insert into 
WTO agreements. For example, on intellectual property protection, the US proposal `complements and adds to 
the obligations that the US and most FTAA have undertaken through the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)’ (USTR 2001).  The efficacy of the FTAA in pushing the US 
trade agenda will depend on whether other countries in the Americas choose to submit to the FTAA, and as 
scholars of international relations would say to `bandwagon’ with the United States or whether they might 
attempt to counter-balance US power by reinforcing their capacity to negotiate collectively in groupings such as 
MERCOSUR. 
 
Outside of trade a similar trend in diplomacy exists in security where `coalitions of the willing’ are increasingly 
used to undertake foreign policy goals. In Kosovo for example,  
[expand this para using the evidence from Kosovo and from Afghanistan, contrasting ] 
 
What does this mean for global governance? Bilateralism and regional arrangements offer all states an 
alternative to purely multilateral regimes.  However, the states who benefit most from such arrangements are 
those with the largest market access to offer, the largest security umbrella to share, and the greatest capacity to 
threaten negative consequences from non-compliance or exclusion.  The United States has the largest single 
trade market and defence capacity. This means that in negotiations with any one state or small combination of 
states, negotiations are asymmetrically weighted towards US preferences and policies.  Other countries worry 
that in long run the US will create a trade area within which it calls all the shots and other countries have little 
choice but to belong. For this reason smaller and less powerful states have long endorsed the need to undertake 
negotiations in universal, multilateral institutions, even as they `cover their bets’ by participating in bilateral or 
regional arrangements with the United States.  
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All that said, as hinted above there are powerful limits on how far the US can turn its back on multilateralism 
and the genuine participation of other countries in the forging of international institutions.  In the security realm, 
this is due both to the nature of security threats and to the emergence of new actors.  Long prior to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, it was clear to the US Commission on National Security that 
the military superiority of the US would not protect it from the emerging threats to US security.  Not only did 
the Commission note with extraordinary foresight that terrorists and other disaffected groups would cause 
Americans to die, possibly in large numbers, on American soil, but in the Commission’s words `the most serious 
threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups using 
genetically engineered pathogens’ (USCNS 1999, p.8).  Countering these kinds of threats requires not just 
different domestic institutions but a new form of diplomacy, international intelligence collection, security 
provision, and the building of international coalitions.  It is not yet clear whether the US engagement in global 
governance will take the form of a renewed commitment to multilateralism or a preference for `coalitions of the 
willing’.  However, what is clear is that to respond to the vulnerabilities of globalization not just in the world 
economy but equally for security, a new engagement in global governance is required.  
 
(b) the disillusionment of developing countries and of civil society 
 
The other challenge facing multilateral organizations is that large sections of the public no longer buy the idea 
that they are represented in institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the UN Security Council,  or the 
WTO, nor that the institutions are adequately accountable for what they do. In reality, representation and 
accountability have always been weak in these multilateral institutions. Now, however, the weaknesses are 
glaring because the institutions are being called upon by their powerful members to intrude much more deeply 
into areas which were previously the preserve of national governments.  Consider the increasing intrusiveness of 
international organizations in three areas.  
 
In the security realm there has been a marked shift in international intervention. Prior to the end of the Cold 
War superpowers meddled in states all over the world in order to preserve their sphere of influence in the 
global balance of power. Since 1990 a new challenge has arisen, spurring a different kind of intervention. 
As civil and ethnic conflict erupts within states in virtually every region of the world, it has sparked 
international humanitarian and security concerns. International institutions and security alliances have been 
called upon to intervene in order to contain such conflicts, to stabilize the regional threat they pose and to 
alleviate the humanitarian catastrophes which result. The UN in particular has been called upon to assist in 
peacemaking, peace-building and peace enforcement within states. 
 
Intervention to stem crises occurring within states is not diminishing. Indeed, the US Commission on 
National Security in the 21
st Century, again with seeming prescience as to the situation in Afhanistan, 
reported in February 1999:  
`over the next 25 years...most violence will erupt from conflicts internal to current territorial 
states....In consequence, the number of new states, international protectorates, and zones of 
autonomy will increase, and many will be born in violence.’ 
The Commission then reflected that 
`The major powers will struggle to devise an accountable and effective institutional response to 
such crises’. (USCNS 1999) 
Few countries accept that the existing institutional structure is adequate.  
 
In the international financial system, a new intrusiveness has also emerged in response to the challenges of 
globalized capital and financial markets. In the wake of financial crises in the 1990s, policy-makers 
desperate to contain the risks and vulnerabilities involved in highly mobile, globalized capital markets have 
sought ways to strengthen and stabilize the system. The main G-7 response has been to call upon the IMF 
to ensure `forceful, far-reaching structural reforms' in the economies of their members in order (among 
other things) to correct weaknesses in domestic financial systems and ensure growth and poverty alleviation 
(IMF 1998). The World Bank has been expected to follow suit. This epitomizes a decade of dramatic 
rewriting of the role of the multilateral organizations. 
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Twenty years ago, the IMF and World Bank concerned themselves respectively with setting targets for 
achieving macroeconomic stability and making project loans. The past two decades have witnesses a 
gradual expansion of each institution into prescribing and requiring measures of structural and institutional 
reform. This new interventionism has been detailed with more specificity by Devesh Kapur who has 
calculated that whereas in the 1980s borrowing countries were required to conform to say 6-10 
`performance criteria’, in the 1990s an average of some 26 measures were being required by the IMF and 
World Bank (Kapur, 2001). The work of the IMF and World Bank now takes them into the heart of 
domestic politics within borrowing member states, advising and monitoring reforms in areas such as the 
rule of law, judicial reform, corruption, and corporate governance. 
 
The problem is that the constitutional structures of the IMF and World Bank reflect their origins as 
essentially technical agencies dealing with issues of international coordination. Yet their activities have 
expanded well beyond that which was originally envisaged and their representative structures do not 
adequately hold them to account (as will be discussed further below). The new `opening up’ of the 
institutions to the public by publishing their work and consulting more with non-governmental 
organizations and `civil society’, as well as the strengthening and creation of new agencies of monitoring, 
evaluation and review are all recognitions that the old-style multilateralism has to find new ways to 
legitimate itself.  
 
In international trade a similar picture emerges. Since 1986 international trade rules have expanded to cover 
domestic or national rules on foreign direct investment, the entry of foreign personnel, intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS), trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical 
barriers to trade, anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing duties (WTO, Multilateral Agreement on 
Trade in Goods). This list seems now to be expanding to include competition policy and government 
procurement both of which are being discussed by WTO working groups.  The international limitations 
being imposed on national governments are stark. A simple example is that a government wishing to 
maintain a high standard of food safety or environmental protection is now limited by strict international 
rules as rulings on beef hormones and the use of dolphin-safe fishing nets have shown (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001). 
 
Even though all states enjoy an equal vote in the World Trade Organization, nevertheless developing 
countries have little scope to hold it to account.  This is because in reality WTO decisions are adopted by 
consensus and that consensus tends to be thrashed out in informal negotiations meetings (often called the 
`Green Room’ process) which are dominated by the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada 
(`the Quad’).  The bottom line in these negotiations is that states with large market-shares enjoy the most 
significant input and influence over decisions. In essence this leaves most developing countries as decision-
takers (Woods and  Narlikar 2001). Furthermore, private sector actors from the powerful Quad countries 
play a vital behind-the-scenes role (Dobson and Jacquet 1999) and those NGOs who play a role tend 
overwhelmingly to be from industrialized countries: for example, of the 738 NGOs accredited to the 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle, 87% were based in industrialised countries.  
 
The implication of the analysis so far is that global governance is being pushed to foster deeper cooperation 
among states not just about inter-state rules but also about their domestic arrangements.  This means 
multilateral agencies are impinging more than ever on decisions directly affecting local communities, 
interest-groups, and national domestic political and economic arrangements, particularly in developing 
countries.  The problem is that these agencies are perceived as remote and unaccountable to most people 
within the developing world.  To put this in the language of democracy theorists, it is not clear that the new 
global governors enjoy the consent of the governed. 
 
In each of the UNSC, IMF, World Bank and WTO all member countries are represented on the governing 
bodies of the institution.  In theory, this enables people across the world to hold the institutions to account 
provided:  (1) they have a government which actually represents them; (2) all governments are adequately 
represented on the governing body of the international organization; (3) that the governing body comprising 
governments genuinely supervises and directs the work of the organization; and (4) that the management 
and staff of the organizations respond and are equally influenced by all government members. These 
presumptions do not all hold in any international organization. Not all people are genuinely represented by 
their governments. Furthermore, not all governments are directly or equally represented in the organizations 
discussed so far. HDR 2002, Background Paper (first draft) by Ngaire Woods, page 10 
 
 
In the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations Security Council a few powerful countries are 
represented by their own government such as the UK, USA, and France. Most countries are not. Rather 
most people of the world live in countries who are grouped together in large constituencies represented by 
just one representative. In the World Bank, for example, the peoples of Angola, Botswana, Burundi, 
Eritrea, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are represented by just 
one Executive Director. 
 
In the IMF and the World Bank, the voting power of each country is not equal but is based on a series of 
formulae which give heavier weighting to larger economies (see box below). In the UN Security Council 
five of the fifteen seats on the Council are held by the largest victors of the second world war (USA, UK, 
France, PRC and Russia) and each has a power to veto an action or resolution undertaken by the Council. 
All other states are represented by rotating elections to the other ten seats on the Council. 
 
Box 2. Developing countries representation in international organizations 
[pie graphs of representation and voting power in IMF, WB, UNSC, UNGA, WTO] 
 
Beyond formal rules and representation, the work of international organizations is heavily shaped by 
informal influences and conventions which seldom weight the scales in favour of developing countries. For 
example, the heads of the World Bank and IMF are chosen according to a political convention whereby the 
United States and Europe get to nominate their own candidate for each respectively. Other countries and 
critics rightly brand the process non-transparent and insufficiently accountable . The Fund and Bank are 
also perceived to be overly accountable  to their largest shareholder, the United States, largely through 
informal influences such as the location and staffing of the organizations and their susceptibility to pressure 
from the US Executive and Congress.  
 
The disproportionate capacity (compared to all other members) of the US to hold the UN or the IMF to 
account is illustrated in each round of negotiations on contributions. For example, in the last negotiations 
for increasing the IMF’s resources, the US Congress, with no consultation with other governments, 
succeeded in setting down unilateral terms for change and reform in the IMF, in return for which a quota 
increase was agreed (Locke, 2000). Similarly in the United Nations, a package of reforms was agreed at the 
behest of the United States in [complete and cite]. The capacity of one government to hold any international 
institution to account, greatly magnifies and highlights gaps in accountability to all other stakeholders and 
especially developing countries.  A similar pattern is emerging in the global private sector. 
 
1.3 The global private sector  
 
Global private sector governance is much quieter and less visible than multilateralism and inter-state 
institutions. Yet it provides a vital set of norms and institutions which are part of global governance. For 
example, the International Chamber of Commerce declares that it enjoys ` unrivalled authority in making 
rules that govern the conduct of business across borders. Although these rules are voluntary, they are 
observed in countless thousands of transactions every day and have become part of the fabric of 
international trade’ (ICC 2001).  Along with its private rule-setting function, the ICC provides the 
International Court of Arbitration, the world's leading arbitral institution.  Like other private sector 
organizations, the ICC has close links to governments and multilateral organizations. Indeed, within a year 
of the creation of the United Nations, the ICC was granted consultative status at the highest level with the 
UN and its specialized agencies. This is but one small part of private sector global governance. 
 
The trend towards private sector (sometimes referred to as private network) governance in part reflects the 
needs of companies who have become more global in their operations, productions networks, and 
commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). Where possible, such transnational corporations avoid 
state or inter-state regulation. Instead they create their own tier of private-sector `governance’, `standard 
setting’, `codes of best practice’ or self-regulation.  For example, from 1973 onwards the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) successfully edged out inter-governmental efforts to promulgate 
regulation and the setting of accountancy standards, taking up a central role now recognized by the G-7, the 
IMF and the World Bank in 1998 (Martinez 2001).  Similarly in the financial sector there is the Washington 
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financial sector actors, major private credit-rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and 
US cyberspace companies who have crafted codes on privacy, property rights, and copyright laws (Lessig 
1999).  
 
The US private sector plays a powerful role at the centre of this kind of governance. In the international 
chemistry industry, for example, it is the American Chemistry Council (ACC) representing all major US 
chemical companies has launched a `Responsible Care’ code in 1988 in response to public concerns about 
the manufacture and use of chemicals. The code requires members continually improve their health, safety 
and environmental performance; to listen and respond to public concerns; to assist each other to achieve 
optimum performance; and to report their goals and progress to the public. The code is now being adopted 
in some 46 countries, representing over 85 percent of the world's chemical production (ACC 2001).  In a 
more individual fashion US corporations such as Nike and Mattel have created codes of conduct governing 
their subcontractors in less developed countries.  
 
In large part these private sector governance bodies have been created to obviate the need for government 
or inter-governmental regulation and in some cases as a response to growing NGO and media pressure in 
their own home countries.  These kinds of private sector self-governance regimes leave major private sector 
actors based in the world’s largest economies in the driving seat. That said, however, this does not spell an 
involuntary shift in power and authority away from governments and states and towards private actors. On 
the whole private sector governance emerges where powerful states choose not to regulate, or indeed where 
states actively support private sector actors in generating their own regime and then cooperate closely with 
that regime.  
   
For example, the United States government helped to create the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), a non-profit corporation formed to assume responsibility for the governance of 
various aspects of the internet such as the IP address space allocation, protocol parameter assignment, 
domain name system management, and root server system management functions previously performed 
under U.S. Government contract by IANA and other entities (ICANN 2001).  In this instance, the US 
turned to a non-governmental form of governance because it feared that a formal inter-governmental 
organization would be too slow and cumbersome in dealing with rapidly developing issues. (Keohane and 
Nye 2000, 24) 
 
The problem for people within developing countries is that private sector governance and standard-setting 
emanates almost without exception from within the most powerful industrialized countries.  This creates 
private arrangements which affect life in the developing world even more than in the industrialized world 
where the activities of large corporations tend to be quite heavily government-regulated. In much of the 
world the main task of monitoring and publicizing the activities of these companies and their codes is 
undertaken by non-governmental organizations.  
 
One advance in the accountability of the global private sector has been the emergence of `multi-stakeholder 
processes’, meaning networks and commissions which bring together NGOs, transnational corporations and 
governments in order to provide ad hoc monitoring and reporting units (Hemmati et al 2001).  For example, 
the World Commission on Dams began work in 1998 with four commissioners from governments, four 
from private industry, and four from NGOs. It was set up to review the development effectiveness of large 
dams and to develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards for the planning, design, 
appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and decommissioning of dams (World Commission on Dams 
2000, see also Dubash et al 2001).  This network highlights a growing sensitivity by private corporations 
and governments to criticism and monitoring by transnational NGOs whom they are now including within 
networks of governance.  
 
A yet more ambitious example of public-private-NGO partnership in governance is the UN’s recently 
launched Global Compact initiative which brings together private companies, governments, multilateral 
organizations, and NGOs. The objective of the Compact is to bring together governments, companies, 
workers, civil society organizations and the United Nations organization itself to advocate and promulgate 
nine core principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO's Fundamental 
Principles on Rights at Work and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. In signing up to the 
Compact, companies are asked to commit themselves to act on these principles in their own corporate 
domains. Since the formal launch of the Compact on 26 July 2000, the Compact has grown to encompass HDR 2002, Background Paper (first draft) by Ngaire Woods, page 12 
 
several hundred participating companies as well as international labor groups and more than a dozen 
international civil-society organizations.  
 
It bears highlighting that the Global Compact is not a regulatory regime nor even a code of conduct. The 
UN describes it as `a value-based platform designed to promote institutional learning. It utilizes the power 
of transparency and dialogue to identify and disseminate good practices based on universal principles’ (UN 
Global Compact 2001).  http://www.unglobalcompact.orgNevertheless, the Compact reflects the degree to 
which international organizations and large multinational private actors today perceive a need to respond 
not just to global markets but to global social and political pressures: `as markets have gone global, so, too, 
must the idea of corporate citizenship and the practice of corporate social responsibility. In this new global 
economy, it makes good business sense for firms to internalize these principles as integral elements of 
corporate strategies and practices’ (UN Global Compact 2001).http://www.unglobalcompact.org 
 
In large part the new awareness of multinational companies has been achieved by the actions of NGOs and 
the media, especially in industrialized countries. Many companies are now wary of the power of consumers 
in their largest markets to boycott or respond negatively to bad press. For example, large oil companies 
such as BP and Royal Dutch/Shell have been publicly accused of colluding in human rights violations in 
countries such as Colombia and Chad-Cameroon. Both companies have adopted human rights policies 
strongly endorsing the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  Both companies are also offering to 
work more closely and openly with NGOs (BP 2001, Shell 2001).   
 
On a sceptical view, http://www.bp.orghttp://www.shell.orgcompanies, like other actors in global 
governance are simply learning to invest more in their public relations. Nevertheless, even some critics 
believe that corporations have a potential power to effect change, even in areas such as human rights. As 
Human Rights Watch notes `a well-implemented policy [by BP] could have far-reaching effects, since BP 
merged with the U.S. oil major, Amoco, to form the third-largest oil company in the world (behind Shell 
and Exxon), with operations in countries with poor human rights records such as Algeria and Colombia, 
and operating in alliance with Statoil - which also has a human rights policy - in Angola and Azerbaijan’ 
(Human Rights Watch 1999).http://www.hrw.org 
 
In a similar vein, diamond companies such as De Beers have attracted bad publicity about their role in 
mining `blood’ and `conflict’ diamonds in countries where the industry funds and perpetuates brutal civil 
wars such as Sierra Leone. In their Annual Report 2000 De Beers write of the `threat to the entire legitimate 
diamond industry’ posed by the `effect of conflict diamonds on consumer confidence’ (De Beers 2000).  To 
ward off this threat, the diamond industry has created a World Diamond Council based in New York to 
develop, implement, and oversee a tracking system for the export and import of rough diamonds to `prevent 
the exploitation of diamonds for illicit purposes such as war and inhumane acts’ (World Diamond Council 
2001). As with the oil companies above, the extent to which diamond companies implement effective 
policies in this area will depend not on governments or inter-governmental institutions but on NGOs who 
monitor and publicize infractions and thereby create the link between consumers in the North and corporate 
operations in the South.  
 
Private sector initiatives to improve the environment, human rights, workers’ rights and such like reflect a 
response to the growing capacity of consumers and shareholders in large industrialized countries to hold 
companies to account. They also reflect companies’ fears that not only consumers but also employees (both 
present and future) may turn away from companies branded pariahs by transnational NGOs or that 
governments might intervene and regulate at the behest of their voters. The result is a web of private sector 
generated and monitored `standards’, `principles’ and policies, sometimes in cooperation with governments 
or inter-governmental institutions which form an important element of global governance. The 
accountability in these new networks is patchy. Often the world is relying on transnational NGOs as 
agencies of accountability without which many global corporate activities would remain almost entirely 
unmonitored.  
 
1.4 Non-governmental organizations 
 
Highlighted in the discussion so far has been the increasing role of non-governmental organizations, often 
referred to as `global civil society’, in monitoring and drawing attention to issues of global governance. It 
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groups at the turn of the century to over 5,000 at the end of the 1990s (Held et al, p.54). More recently, two 
different kinds of non-governmental organizations have not only increased in number, but have become 
important parts of global governance. 
 
The most visible and vocal NGOs are large transnational non-governmental organizations based in 
industrialized countries who lobby for particular principles or issues such as debt relief, environmental 
protection, and human rights such as Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund, or Oxfam.  These 
groups do not claim to represent countries or geographical groups nor do they represent particular 
commercial interests (although they are accountable to their donors and members and many are also in the 
business of delivering aid or similar goods). Their stake in the arena of global governance is more of a 
deliberative one. They bring principles and values to the attention of the attention of policy-makers and 
firms. They also play a role in monitoring global governance, analysing and reporting on issues as diverse 
as the Chemical Weapons Treaty, negotiations on global climate change, world trade, and the actions of the 
IMF, World Bank, and transnational corporations.  In so doing transnational NGOs provide information, 
debate and criticism which is fundamental to holding both private and governmental sectors to account.   
 
A rather different community of NGOs is now also becoming increasingly involved in the debate and 
implementation of global governance.  More `locally-based’ NGOs predominantly in developing countries 
are being drawn into the fray. These groups claim to represent local constituencies. Many operate to plug 
gaps in their own country’s government. Some try to make up for the fact that their government fails to 
represent a certain section of the population. Others attempt to make up for a government’s lack of capacity 
to deliver certain kinds of assistance or services.  Some are opposed and repressed by their governments. 
Others work closely with their government.  
 
Increasingly these groups are being included in discussions with international aid donors, international 
organizations and other arenas of global governance. Their entry has been catalysed by a number of shifts 
in thinking about both aid and governance. Already in the 1980s, non-governmental organizations, private 
charities and voluntary services were applauded by new conservatives especially in the Thatcher and 
Reagan governments in the UK and USA as alternatives to government involvement in welfare, aid and 
social policy. This thinking spilled over into aid policies which sought to channel aid through non-
governmental groups in both the industrialized and developing countries. That trend changed in the 1990s 
with the rise of international support for democratization and a wave of development thinking focussed on 
strengthening and modernizing the state. It is now recognized that good policies and outcomes require good 
politics. That means effective government, not effective NGOs competing with a weak government.  
 
A different logic now drives the inclusion of locally based NGOs in international fora. Aid institutions and 
donor governments have recognized that wider participation and `ownership’ on the ground is necessary for 
development policies to be successfully implemented.  This has been reiterated in numerous World Bank 
and IMF publications (World Bank 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999 and IMF 1997, 2000).  Getting wider 
ownership and participation is difficult, especially in countries where governments have few networks for 
consultation or representation and where wide gaps exist in terms of who they represent and how. For these 
reasons, agencies such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the UNDP are encouraging both their own 
local representatives and government officials to develop consultative links and closer relations with local 
NGOs. This brings new tensions and problems to both local and international politics.  
 
A key issue raised by the emergence of NGOs in global governance is who chooses which NGOs to include 
or consult in national or international negotiations? At the national level, if the government plays a key role, 
critics allege that genuine consultation is not taking place. Where outsiders play a role, governments argue 
that their sovereignty and their own processes of democracy are being subverted. Where the local 
representatives of international organizations are involved, they risk becoming powerful gate-keepers who 
use their power to favour some groups over others to cement and further their own position. At the 
international level all these problems are replicated. For these reasons, the increasing reliance at the global 
level on NGOs to provide some modicum of accountability in itself poses important new challenges to the 
legitimacy and accountability of global governance.  
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1.5 Independent experts 
 
A growing trend in global governance is the temptation by governments to use `technical’ or `expert’ 
groups or networks as a flexible and efficient way to manage globalization.  The approach eschews old-
fashioned representative institutions in which politics and power among states are central. Rather, the 
emerging pattern of governance replaces state-based institutions of governance with networks of experts so 
as `to preserve national democratic processes and embedded liberal compromises while allowing the 
benefits of economic integration’ (Keohane and Nye 2000, 37). 
 
The presumptions underpinning this model are institutionalist and functionalist. The focus is on cooperation 
rather than power. The goal is to `get the job done’ rather than to waste undue energy on process.  
Networks comprise participants with special technical expertise and material stakes in an issue, such as the 
chemicals, accountancy and financial stability networks mentioned above.  Because they are selective, 
these networks are cohesive, technically sophisticated and efficient. Their legitimacy derives from their 
efficiency or the quality of the outcomes they produce i.e. results not process matter most, or to express it in 
the language of some political scientists, the quality of the outputs matters more than the democratic inputs.  
 
An example of expert or network governance is the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was convened at the 
behest of the G-7 in April 1999, to promote international financial stability through information exchange 
and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance. The new network was self-
consciously selective, bringing together experts from the most important players in the international 
financial system including national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international 
financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators 
and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. There was no sense that the FSF should represent 
all countries or regions of the world. Rather its goal was to co-ordinate the efforts of various bodies in order 
to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk 
(FSF 2001). The http://www.fsforum.orglegitimacy of the FSF rests on its efficiency in achieving its stated 
goals. That said, however, interestingly the G7 have found it necessary to expand its membership to include 
representatives from Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and the Netherlands (FSF 2001). 
 
The `efficiency’ or output rationale for governance is enjoying a growing appeal among scholars and 
policy-makers alike. Indeed, we find it being applied to a number of other inter-governmental bodies. Three 
examples come to mind: the IMF, the European Union, and the WTO.  In each case arguments have been 
made for more independent and expert-oriented governance so as to avoid the problems, vested interests 
and contradictions which arise from domestically-rooted inter-governmentalism. Part of the argument has 
been elegantly expressed by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann in the following terms: `governments risk to become 
prisoners of the sirene-like pressures of organized interest groups unless they follow the wisdom of Ulysses 
(when his boat approached the island of the Sirenes) and tie their hands to the mast of international 
guarantees’ (Petersmann, p.5). Away from the hurly-burly of domestic politics, policy-makers (we are led 
to believe) can come to more rational and selfless conclusions.  
 
In respect of the IMF it has been argued that the IMF `should be made truly independent and accountable’ 
so as `to permit it to focus more efficiently on surveillance and conditionality’ (De Gregorio et al 1999).  
These authors proposed that the IMF’s Executive Directors should be discouraged from taking advice from 
their governments. Like a central bank, the IMF should be permitted to work in a more technical, 
independent way with its accountability ensured through transparency and a different kind of oversight by 
member governments. The rationale is that just as independent central banks have proven better at fighting 
inflation, so too an independent world authority would better protect international financial stability.   
 
There is even a suggestion that a more independent IMF could also be more accountable.  Three discrete 
measures are proposed to ensure this: (1) increased transparency with the publication of voting records, 
Executive Board minutes and performance evaluations; (2) the strengthening and bolstering of an oversight 
committee comprising Finance Ministers; and (3) a requirement that Executive Directors justify their 
actions in terms of an explicit mandate such as `to advance economic and financial stability’ and face 
dismissal by the oversight committee if they failed. This chapter will return to some of these issues in the 
next section.  
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IMF makes political rather than technical decisions and the extent of disagreement even on so-called 
`technical’ issues about what policies undertaken in which order and in which country will best advance 
economic and financial stability. At the very least considerations of `for whom?’, and `at whose cost?’ will 
weight the answers.  This is why the process of decision-making in the IMF is unavoidably political. In the 
end it involves ranking and prioritizing the rights and obligations of different groups of people.  Protesters 
on the streets argue that the IMF always resolves such questions in favour of creditors, both government 
and private sector. Developing countries argue that they are marginalized not just by the formal rules but 
equally, if not more by the informal mechanisms of influence and decision-making within the institutions. It 
is not clear that making the IMF more independent would alter either of these perceptions.  
 
In the European Union a similar output-oriented rationale for governance is emerging. Put simply it is that: 
`At the end of the day, what interests them [ie people living in the EU] is not who solves these problems, 
but the fact that they are being tackled’ (Prodi 1999).  This output-oriented rationale is strongest in 
arguments for European Monetary Union (EMU) and more specifically in the nature and structure of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) which lies at the heart of EMU. The ECB is an independent and 
unaccountable body (e.g. compared to its counterparts in the UK, USA and Japan all of which publish 
formal voting records of their decisions), whose legitimacy rests on its technical and expert nature rather 
than a potential representativeness or democratic accountability.  
 
More recently efficiency or output arguments have been extended beyond the European Central Bank. They 
are emerging in wider and more political initiatives such as institutional reform and enlargement where 
questions of legitimacy and democracy, it has been argued by one scholar, are increasingly being left to be 
dealt with as issues for public relations not institutional reform (Kohler-Koch 1999).  European 
Commissioner Michel Barnier underscored this view in his very recent call for European policy-makers to 
go beyond negotiating the `necessary technical adaptations’ to institutions and to consider how to reinforce 
the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Barnier 2001). 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a final example of an organization we are told should be more 
independent. In order to minimize the rent-seeking producer interests who have so much power at the 
national level, it has been argued that the global trading system should be `constitutionalized’ where a 
written constitution is understood as `a contractual means by which citizens secured their freedom through 
long-term basic rules of a higher legal rank’. (Petersmann 1995) Similar arguments are made by quite a 
wide range of scholars pressing for the WTO to become a vehicle for enforcing core values in human 
rights, environmental protection and labour standards. 
 
In constitutionalizing the WTO it is assumed that the `long-term basic rules’ on which trade should proceed 
are relatively uncontestable and should not be shipwrecked on the ragged shores of national politics. Yet 
many would argue that these rules belong in the national realm, encroaching as they do into issues of 
welfare, the environment, labour rights, and intellectual property protection. They reflect not some higher 
legal truth but deeply political priorities and choices over which citizens should have some say. This is not 
a simple contest between economists who favour liberalization versus NGOs pushing human rights and 
other values. The outcomes involve subtle adjudications over priorities, means and ends. Should one form 
of environmental protection be privileged over another? Should one specied of dolphin be protected more 
than another? Most importantly of all, who should decide and to whom should they be accountable?  
 
One response to the political problems of constitutionalizing the WTO has been to argue that the institution 
should be more `inclusive’ (Howse and Nicolaidis, 2000).  By including NGOs and other interested or 
expert parties for example we can improve the quality of deliberations and decisions on trade issues. To 
quote one enthusiast: `the right way to defeat bad ideas is with better ideas. Just as national democracy 
entails participation and debate at the domestic level, so too does democratic global governance entail 
participation by transnational NGOs’ (Charnovitz, 2000).  There are a couple of problems embedded in this 
argument.  
 
In the first place, the inclusion of NGOs will not necessarily redress the failure of the WTO adequately to 
represent some countries and groups while it over-represents others. Indeed, inclusion might exacerbate 
rather than redress the lack of voice and influence suffered by developing countries. For instance of the 738 
NGOs accredited to the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle, 87% were based in industrialised 
countries. Enthusiasts of inclusion need to consider more carefully how NGOs might be included without HDR 2002, Background Paper (first draft) by Ngaire Woods, page 16 
 
further distorting the underrepresentation of developing countries and peoples in the WTO. 
 
A second problem arises with the broader argument that we might consider the WTO as a deliberative 
space within which the best ideas win. In this argument for `network governance’ the focus shifts from 
procedures and  `inputs’ (i.e. elections and representative government) to the quality of debate and the 
`outputs’ of the system.  The inclusion of NGOs and experts is said to ensure high-quality deliberation 
which improves outputs. This is because the process of deliberation is one in which the best ideas can be 
aired and genuinely expert participants can partake without the limitations of a representative system.  
Participants `learn’ and change their minds, coming better to understand alternatives and modify their own 
starting positions. 
 
The missing element in the deliberative network model is politics. The kinds of vested interests which 
`distort’ trade policy at the national level are assumed to disappear at the international level. Yet even a 
cursory examination of private sector participation in existing WTO negotiations reveals their powerful 
influence.  Groups such as the US Coalition of Services Industries (CSI 2001) http://www.uscsi.organd 
International Financial Services, London (IFSL 2001) http://www.bi.org.ukwere deeply involved in 
negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the WTO Basic Telecommunications and 
Financial Services Agreements. The Financial Leaders Group, a private sector group of North American, 
European, Japanese, Canadian, and Hong Kong financial leaders publicizes its role as `a key player in 
securing the 1997 Financial Services Agreement and continues its work in the current WTO services 
negotiations’ (FLG 2001). Naturally representatives of private sector organizations bring a high level of 
expertise and ideas to the negotiating table. However, they represent, indeed they have a duty to represent, 
the narrow sectoral and material interests of their members. It distorts reality to propose that they should 
ensure that the `best’ or `better’ ideas win. The reason they exist and have come to the negotiating table is 
to represent the interests of their members. 
 
The debate about deliberative networks highlights the need to pay attention in global governance to who 
defines the rules and outcomes of deliberation. Those who focus on `outputs’ pay too little attention to 
inputs and decisions about who participates, who sets the agenda, and within what parameters the 
acceptable outcomes must fall. In so doing, the network governance enthusiasts overlook deep problems of 
legitimacy and accountability which arise from these processes. 
 
For developing countries the question of who controls networks, their agendas and powers is vital. Take the 
example of the FSF mentioned above which has three issues on its agenda: capital flows, off-shore financial 
centres, and highly-leveraged institutions (FSF 2001). All three have a direct impact on developing 
countries who are vulnerable to the systemic risks and issues involved, and some of whom will be directly 
affected by regulation in this area which could reduce offshore financial activities upon which they rely.  
Governance in these areas - be it regulation or standards - will benefit some countries and cause significant 
costs to others. What will justify these choices?   
 
For output-oriented governance specialists the answer is the quality of the results and their contribution to 
international financial stability.  Critics on the other hand argue that the results are very subjective. There 
are many competing models of international financial stability. Some focus on regulation, others on 
liberalization. Some emphasize capital controls, others on universal openness of capital accounts. The 
vigorous debate about which measures best achieve international financial stability underscores the need for 
a legitimate process of goal-setting and policy-making and the need for that process to be an accountable 
one. 
 
The new trend towards more independent, technocratic governance unshackled by the clumsy and 
unmanageable constraints of multilateralism might well obscure but certainly does not extinguish the 
political forces and vested interests which underpin governance at the global level. For this reason greater 
not less accountability of a political nature must be sought in each arena of global governance. 
 
2. Improving accountability in global governance 
 
The previous section analyses new trends in global governance and highlights a number of gaps and biases 
in accountability. For some there is a simple solution to this problem and that is to democratize 
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the extent to which democracy is possible at the international level. It is risky because it suggests a way to 
legitimate supplanting democracy at the national level with a more intrusive global governance.   
 
The evidence about emerging global governance suggests that the pressing question is not how one might 
reinforce the power and scope of international institutions to regulate the affairs of member states. Rather, 
the more urgent question is how to make existing institutions of global governance more accountable to 
those they most affect? Let us consider why this would not be fully achieved by democratizing the 
institutions. 
 
2.1 The limits of democratic accountability  
 
It is easy to imagine that if all governments in the world were both democratically elected and equally 
represented in international organizations, there would be far less of a problem of accountability in global 
governance.  However, it is worth noting immediately that even in such an ideal world, the capacity of 
people to hold international institutions to account would still be very limited. 
 
In the first place, there is an unavoidable `democratic deficit’ in international organizations because people 
do not get directly to elect (nor to throw out) their representatives on the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank or 
the UNSC. Instead, those who live in democracies get to elect politicians some of whom form a 
government which appoints Ministers who represent and choose delegations to represent a country. For this 
reason, even in an ideal, universally democratic world, international economic governance is removed from 
representative government. Even if they so wished, citizens could not use their votes effectively to 
influence, restrain or hold to account their government in its actions in an international organization. And 
even less directly in countries with highly developed systems of parliamentary accountability such as the 
United Kingdom, the oversight by parliament of international institutions is weak. In most developing 
countries it is yet weaker. 
 
However, the `democratic deficit’ does not rule out improving the accountability of international 
organizations. In fact, looking a little harder at the argument for democratizing international institutions, it 
is sometimes used wrongly to suggest that in directly-elected democracies, voting and representation are the 
principal means by which governments are held to account. In theory citizens could use elections to reward 
or punish politicians. In reality, votes are rarely used this way.  Political scientists have shown that voters 
do not tend to use their votes to sanction officials for abuse, neglect, or incompetence (or indeed to reward 
the opposite). Voters often use elections to express party loyalty or enthusiasm for a future set of policies 
(Przeworkski, Stokes & Manin 1999).  Very often voters face `problems of information, monitoring, and 
commitment’(Maravall 1999).  For these reasons, elections are not the principal form of accountability 
within national political systems. And if they are not in national politics, it is inconceivable that the same 
elections might hold a government to account for its actions in an international economic organization.  
 
Governments are held to account through a variety of different social, political and legal institutions.  These 
same institutions also hold other actors to account. And it is to these institutions that we must turn to find 
ways in which to make global governance more accountability.  The fundamental elements include 
ensuring that actors exercising power are: 
(1) transparent about what they are doing and why; 
(2) monitored in their work, policies and operations and that the results are reported; 
(3) enforcement takes place to ensure actions stay within jurisdictional bounds and conform to 
relevant rules, norms and policies. 
In respect of global governance, we need to examine whether such steps are being taken so as to increase 
the accountability of the international organizations, in particular to their developing country members? 
 
2.2 Transparency and monitoring: how much accountability? 
 
Transparency refers to the recording, reporting and publishing of information about the processes, decisions 
and outcomes of an institution. Although it is a cornerstone of accountability, most organizations have 
strong reasons for limiting transparency. These include the need to protect proprietary or confidential 
information and a belief that openness would adversely affect their decision-making process. Principally 
the fear is that publication would limit full and frank discussion of a topic, closing off the opportunities for 
finding consensus among participants and that transparency entrenches people in particular positions that HDR 2002, Background Paper (first draft) by Ngaire Woods, page 18 
 
they have to account for afterwards to those they represent outside the walls of the meeting. Of course, the 
latter reason implies a fear of too much accountability of participants to those they represent. 
 
In many instances decision-makers worst fears about transparency have proven ill-founded. For example, 
for a long time interest rates were set in the United Kingdom by a secretive process which was deemed 
necessary due to the sensitivity of the decisions made and the need to protect an open debate amongst those 
making the decisions. Yet since the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England 
in1998, both the minutes and votes of individual members of the Committee have been recorded and 
published shortly after meetings. Far from reflecting worst fears, the result has not been to shut down real 
debate and to limit discussion. To cite an expert outsider’s assessment gleaned from conversations with the 
members of the committee: `Discussions were said to be lively and well focused on the relevant 
information and the decision to be made, with ample opportunity for examining key issues and for airing a 
full range of views by all MPC members’ (Kohn 2000, 2). 
 
Opposition to transparency has gradually waned in both the public and private sectors as previously 
perceived dangers have been recognized as overstated. Indeed a revolution has occurred in many 
international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank.  In the IMF where information was previously 
inaccessible to anyone outside the walls of the institution, most research is now published on the website 
along with a substantial amount of documentation regarding its work with individual countries. 
Furthermore, the IMF is pressing governments to permit greater disclosure and publication of policies and 
agreements made with the IMF (these must be kept confidential if  a government so wishes).  
 
The most noticeable gap in the transparency of both the IMF and the World Bank regards decisions taken 
by their Executive Boards. The minutes of Board meetings are not published. Votes are not taken and 
therefore cannot be recorded or publicized. This is a significant omission for institutions which purport to 
be representative and whose member governments claim to be accountable to their own people. It is 
extremely difficult to hold one’s government to account for a collective decision if their role in that 
decision is not known. The counter-case is often made that the secrecy of Board deliberations and 
members’ positions reinforces the `collegiality’ of the Executive Board and its capacity to make decisions 
by consensus.  This argument is the same as that made for `independent expert’ governance as already 
discussed above in section 1.4.  As argued there, it suffers from an overly technocratic view of the decisions 
being made and in the end fails to persuade that the Board’s obligation to be accountable is outweighed by 
the benefits of being unaccountable.  
 
Along with transparency, evaluation and monitoring are core elements of accountability. Most institutions 
are under constant pressure from shareholders and members as well as outside NGOs and critics, to 
evaluate their operations and effectiveness in a more through, effective and public way. The new 
expectation that institutions conduct and publish critical evaluations of themselves was highlighted by the 
UN’s publication of a very critical independent examination of UN policy in Rwanda, commissioned by the 
Secretary General in May 1999 (UN 1999).  Similarly the Executive Board of the IMF has undertaken and 
published three independent evaluations of the work of the Fund: the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility, IMF surveillance, and the research role of the institution.  Prior to this new trend, critical 
evaluations tended not to be made publicly available. Indeed, when the World Bank undertook a path-
breaking evaluation into its own policies, the resulting `Wapenhans report’ was not made publicly available 
(World Bank 1992).   
 
While outside assessments provide useful snapshots of institutions, most organizations also benefit from 
continual internal monitoring. For example, the World Bank has the longest standing independent 
evaluation office, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) which sits within the Bank and reports 
directly to the Executive Board. The OED rates the development impact and performance of all the Bank's 
completed lending operations, the Bank’s policies and processes.  It works alongside at least four other 
monitoring units within the institution including the Quality Assurance Group, the Internal Auditing 
Department, the Monitoring and Evaluation Service and the World Bank Institute’s Evaluation and 
Scholarship Department.  
 
[add a note on evaluation and monitoring within UN agencies] 
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ignored and not followed up. This was highlighted by the specially-formed Evaluation Group of Executive 
Directors in the IMF who noted the lack of follow-up and monitoring of changes and reform subsequent to 
any evaluation (IMF, 2001).  Indeed, the very first listed goal of the IMF’s new Independent Evaluation 
Office (IEO) reads: `Enhancing the learning culture of the IMF and enabling it to better absorb lessons for 
improvements in its future work’ (IEO/IMF 2001).   
 
Many both within and outside of international organizations believe that publishing critical evaluations of 
an organization is one way to ensure that findings get some public attention and external pressure for 
change which can help to overcome inertia or vested interests within the organization. As yet however, the 
IMF does not publish all evaluations of its work. For example, the work of the Office of Internal Audit and 
Inspection (OIA) is not published, nor are all internal evaluations undertaken by operational staff.  Equally 
in the World Bank not all the work of the OED is published even though since 1993 its “Annual Review of 
Evaluation Results” (ARDE) has been published along with summaries of evaluation reports for selected 
projects.  Without publication not just of activities but of independent assessments of what organizations 
are doing, it is difficult for the public to judge how well or poorly an organization is undertaking its 
responsibilities and equally difficult for outsiders to offer support to insiders who recognize the need for 
change. For this reason monitoring and transparency are intertwined. 
 
Turning to developing countries, the more specific question is whether increased information and 
monitoring in and of themselves can help people in developing countries hold global institutions adequately 
to account? This depends on the capacity within and among developing countries to absorb, publicize and 
act on information. When information is released into the public domain, it needs to be picked up and 
publicized by NGOs, the media, politicians and others at the national level and subsequently translated into 
governmental and non-governmental pressures on the international organization. The problem for 
developing countries is that they see this occurring much more in industrialized countries. The result is to 
increase the influence of industrialized countries through informal channels and thereby further marginalize 
the influence of developing countries. Unsurprising then that developing countries have often opposed 
increased transparency and monitoring. However, blanket opposition cuts off an important longer-term goal 
of holding these institutions better and more equitably to account.  
 
There are several more subtle issues within the realm of transparency and monitoring which demand the 
attention in particular of developing countries. In the first place, for practical reasons not all information 
can be collected and released about all activities. It is vital, therefore, to examine the alternatives, analysing 
which kinds of information (collected by whom and how) will most benefit development? Too often 
arguments for transparency in all international organizations ignore the costs and opportunity costs of 
choices about what to monitor and what to publicize.  
 
Transparency requires making some difficult trade-offs. For example, at the national level consider the 
choice between collecting elaborate forms of data which might assist in economic modelling, and simpler 
forms of data which might be adequate for development planning.  The choice has implications both for 
cost and for the capacity of local agencies to aggregate the information.  At the international level the same 
trade-offs apply but the question of who pays for transparency is often less clear. Yet in the IMF and World 
Bank, for example, it is borrowing members who bear the cost of increased transparency and monitoring 
through increased loan charges. Across the wider spectrum of international agencies,  budgets spent on 
transparency and monitoring not only might otherwise be spent directly on development, but also represent 
choices about what to monitor and for at whose behest?  
 
[Box 3. Tough choices about transparency: comparison of two sets of data] 
 
2.3 Judicial-style accountability and its limits 
 
A more active form of accountability with a direct counterpart in national governments is judicial-style 
accountability which uses refers to tribunals, ombudsmen or other processes of redress. The object is to 
ensure that organizations act within their powers and in keeping with their own operational rules. Judicial-
style panels or actors examine specific actions or decisions taken by an institution in order to adjudicate 
whether or not some breach has occurred. Often in the case of courts, tribunals or ombudsmen there are few 
direct powers positively to direct a wrong-doing institution to take some alternative course of action. Rather 




Two unprecedented steps in global governance have been taken in this regard in the World Bank group. In 
1993 an Inspection Panel was created by the Executive Board of the World Bank to service the IBRD and 
IDA. The Inspection Panel can receive complaints from any group able to show that: (1) they live in the 
project area (or represent people who do) and are likely to be affected adversely by project activities; (2) 
they believe that the actual or likely harm they have suffered results from failure by the Bank to follow its 
policies and procedures; (3) their concerns have been discussed with Bank management and they are not 
satisfied with the outcome. A three-person Inspection Panel has powers to make a preliminary assessment 
of the merits of a complaint brought by a group, taking into account Bank management responses to the 
allegations. Subsequently, the Panel can recommend to the Board that a full investigation be undertaken, 
and make recommendations on the basis of such a full investigation. The Executive Board retains the power 
to permit investigations to proceed, and to make final decisions based on the Panel’s findings and Bank 
Management’s recommendations.  
 
A different model of judicial-style accountability was created in 1999 to service two other agencies within 
the World Bank group:  the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). A Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman’s office  (CAO) was set up after 
consultations with shareholders, NGOs and members of the business community. The aim is to find a 
workable and constructive approach to dealing with environmental and social concerns and complaints of 
people directly impacted by IFC and for MIGA financed projects.  The CAO or ombudsman and her staff 
are independent of the Bank and IFC and report directly to the President of the World Bank. The emphasis 
of the office’s work is on dialogue, mediation and conciliation. The CAO has the power to make 
recommendations but not to act as `a judge, court or policeman’.   
 
There are several obvious limits to judicial-style accountability.  First, not everyone is in an equal position 
to use the procedures available, not just in bringing formal complaints but in ensuring that the threat of such 
actions keeps officials of an institution within their powers and rules.  In many cases people in developing 
countries have relied on Northern NGOs to assist in funding and presenting their case.  
 
Critics allege that the role of NGOs risks skewing the work of accountability tribunals in favour of issues 
and areas of most concern to people within industrialized countries, as expressed through Northern NGOs, 
leaving unserviced those people in the developing world who have not attracted the attention of such 
NGOs. A further risk is that the outcomes of a formal process such as the Inspection Panel, may well end 
up being shaped more by the needs of Northern NGOs to garner publicity through confrontation and show-
down, rather than by quiet measures which more modestly improve the lives of those directly.  
 
[Box 4. The limits of judicial inspection: the China Western Poverty Reduction Project] [include quotes 
from ICT, Inspection Panel, Bank management, and critics] 
 
A second limitation on judicial-style accountability is that the process can be used to attack good decisions 
which suffer minor technical flaw in respect of the rules.  It can also be long, costly and time-consuming, 
diverting resources away from the central purposes of the institution. For this reason the thresh-hold or 
cause for complaint which can spark a full inspection or action is crucial.  
 
A final important limitation in judicial-style accountability is that the process examines whether an 
institution has adhered to its existing policies and operational rules. It does not examine or adjudicate the 
quality or purposes of those policies or rules.  Judicial-style accountability does not substitute or offer 
recourse against the responsibility of decision-makers to make good policy or rules. It cannot prevent or 
call to account bad decisions being made within the rules. This means that accountability for the quality of 
the rules themselves has to be achieved through some other means.  
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BOX 5: Stronger forms of legal accountability  
 
1. Corporate governance principles  
In corporate governance there are core rules protecting the rights of minority shareholders. [complete] 
 
2. Professional responsibility and negligence with international arbitration 
International organizations who give expert and professional advice to governments could be held 
professionally accountable for the quality and diligence of that advice (just as are accountants, auditors, 
doctors and other professionals). [complete]: (Raffer 1999). 
 
 
The forms of accountability highlighted in box 5 could usefully expand the scope for holding decision-
makers in global governance collectively to account through the recognition of minority or developing 
country shareholders’ rights. It might also hold officials acting in a professional capacity to account for the 
quality and diligence of their work. Still untouched however are a large range of substantive policy 
decisions made by international organizations in which people in developing countries in decision-making 
have little input. Here a real capacity to hold decision-makers to account requires adequate participation in 
the processes of priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and implementation.  
 
2.4 Participation and accountability 
 
In many of the international organizations discussed so far decision-making is characterized by informal 
processes of consultation and consensus-building. As a result, a member wishing to hold other members to 
account needs to be privy to much which cannot be recorded and circulated as a publication. This has been 
highlighted in the case of the WTO where both developing countries and NGOs argue that the 
organization’s procedures should be both more accessible and more transparent and this means more than 
publishing reports and minutes of meetings online.  It requires actual participation in meetings at all levels 
for this is what is required in order to understand the nature and depth of political negotiations and 
compromises which lie behind formal pronouncements. None of the mechanisms of accountability 
discussed so far address this. The WTO provides a useful example.  
 
Participation in international decision-making 
 
Developing countries highlight that most WTO decisions are taken in small group meetings and 
consultations and then presented as a fait accompli at the Council level. For example, `Green room’ 
consultations are usually convened at the initiative of the Director General and include the powerful Quad 
(United States, European Union, Japan and Canada) as well as countries deemed to have a vital interest in 
the issue under discussion and countries which have traditionally played a leading role in the GATT (such 
as Brazil and India representing developing countries, and Bangladesh representing the least developed 
countries). Usually about twenty countries are included in any one Green room consultation.   
 
The problem for most developing countries is that they are excluded from these core yet informal decision-
making processes. A further problem is that even if all meetings were open to them, most developing 
countries do not have the personnel and resources to cover the plethora of groups and discussion going on 
at any one time. The rapid expansion of the WTO’s agenda is exacerbating this problem. It has been 
estimated that there are about 1200 formal and informal WTO meetings taking place through the year 
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). This widening agenda is placing the tremendous pressure on the limited 
resources of developing countries, making it virtually impossible for them to keep abreast of what is going 
on, let alone to contribute knowledgeably and authoritatively to the processes. 
 
Some attempt has been made further to open up the green room and informal processes of negotiations and 
consensus building within the WTO, as has also occurred withinthe UNSC (Wood 1996). In the WTO, 
notifications of small group meetings are posted on bulletin boards, participation in these meetings is by 
invitation as well as self-selection, minutes of at least some informal meetings are published. However, 
even if efforts are made not to present Green Room decisions as a fait accompli, these decisions are 
presented at the Council level only at a fairly final stage of the discussion. It is not easy for developing 
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discussions and lack a detailed understanding of the issues involved. 
 
In summary, for member states wanting to engage and contribute in the policy-making and negotiations of 
the WTO, adequate transparency cannot be achieved through formal minutes and reports because consensus 
is formed within the organization primarily through informal meetings and consultations.  Transparency for 
members requires either presence at all levels of negotiations, or deep and detailed briefings (as opposed to 
formal minutes). Similar points have been made in respect of the United Nations Security Council (Wood 
1996), and other organizations.   
 
The need for more accountability at the international level is further underscored by the lessons being learnt 
about participation and accountability at the interface between national and international organizations. 
 
Participation in joint global-national decision-making 
  
Participation by local actors and governments in order to ensure the efficacy of global governance has 
become the focus of virtually all international and development agencies around the world in recent years. 
The attention to participation has come due to what the IMF identifies as two trends: the increasing 
interaction that the institution has had with civil society, including academics, business groups and NGOs; 
and the realization that a necessary pre-condition for adjustment policy success is broad public support, or 
public ‘ownership’ (IMF 2001a). One direct example of the new focus on participation lies in the process 
by which the Fund and Bank are encouraging `nationally owned’ poverty alleviation strategies. This 
process is worth some attention in order to examine the emerging relationship between participation and 
accountability. 
 
All countries requesting debt relief under the latest phase of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative must adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) developed through a broad-based participatory 
process, or they must at least present an interim paper setting out the government's commitment to and 
plans for developing a PRS (IMF 2001b). The participatory process envisaged is described in the following 
way: `the borrowing country and its people will take the lead. PRSPs [Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers] 
will be prepared by the government, based on a process involving the active participation of civil society, 
NGOs, donors, and international institutions. It is expected that countries will keep civil society informed 
about developments in the program, and involved in monitoring its implementation’ (IMF 2001c).  
 
The rationale for participation is that participatory processes allow for the exchange of information between 
government and other stakeholders; this increases decision-making transparency, which in turn improves 
government accountability to the people; and thereby results in an overall increase in good governance and 
economic efficiency in development activities (WB/IMF 2001, vol 1, part 2.1, p.3).  
 
The expectations of the new participatory process are high: `locally-produced PRSPs are expected to 
generate fresh ideas about strategies and measures needed to reach shared growth and poverty reduction 
goals, and to help develop a sense of ownership and national commitment to reaching those objectives’ 
(IMF 2001c). The role of the IMF and World Bank is `to assist in the process, and it is expected that other 
multilateral and bilateral donors will also provide advice and expertise. However, the strategy and the 
policies should emerge out of national debates in which the voices of the poor, especially, are heard’ (IMF 
2001c). The processes by which this `hearing’ and participation will take place are not altogether clear.  
 
Participation is defined by the institutions as: 
`the process through which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy-
making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services’ (WB/IMF 2001, p.3).  
In practice the term is used to refer to a range of interactions with stakeholders at governmental, national 
and local level, as depicted in box 6 below outlining the World Bank’s definitions of participation. An 
intra-governmental meeting in a Ministry of Finance counts as `participation’ as does a village-level 
participatory poverty assessment. Some interactions involve disseminating information. Others involve 
consultation. In rarer cases interaction involves the kind of collaborative planning and decision-making 
envisaged in the description of shared control over decisions and resources.  
     




One-way flow of information  e.g. translation into local languages, dissemination 
of material, informal presentations and public 
meetings. 
Consultation 
Two-way flow of information  e.g. participatory assessments, beneficiary 
assessments, consultative meetings, field visits and 
interviews. 
Collaboration 
Shared control over 
decisionmaking 
e.g. participatory planning techniques, workshops to 
determine positions and priorities, formation of joint 
committees, joint work with user groups. 
Empowerment 
Transfer of control over 
decisions and resources 
e.g. capacity building for stakeholder organisation, 
strengthening legal status of stakeholder 
organisations, stakeholder authority to manage 
funds, hire and fire workers. 
 
Source: World Bank Participation Group’s Typology of Participatory Mechanisms 
See also McGee 2000. 
 
The implications of participation as envisaged in the PRS process are mixed.  In many cases the desire of 
international institutions to build a participatory capacity and policy-making process has clashed with the 
need to disburse debt relief fast. Hence, in Burkino Faso we find that the HIPC/PRSP process was dealt 
with in a consultation with donors and civil society which lasted one and a half hours (European 
Commission 2000).  In general, where participation has been limited to ad hoc consultations, workshops 
and meetings, there is evidence that it has little effect on decision-making or accountability (SGTS 2000). 
This is especially the case if there is no established relationship among the parties, no clear policy positions, 
and a wide range of priorities and decisions to be adjudicated.  
 
Overall the weak results of the PRS process in ensuring effective participation underlines that participation 
which actually influences policy-making must include: the sharing of information, tasks, and the 
assessment of output; a diversity of institutional partners; and clear control by the government in managing 
the process (SGTS 2000). These elements have been common to two of the slightly more successful PRS 
processes in Vietnam and Uganda. In these cases it also bears noting that each had pre-existing policies and 
institutions to draw upon in their PRS. In each case the government has been held to account in its poverty 
reduction activities by an institutionalised process of transparency, consultation, and participation in both 
planning and subsequent monitoring. 
The experience of the poverty reduction strategy process in a variety of countries highlights that 
information and consultation are necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving accountability to 
stakeholders. Equally vital are institutions which permit participation in the processes of priority-setting, 
policy-making, implementation and monitoring in an ongoing and continuous way. This echoes the 
experience of developing countries in the WTO and other international organizations. It is also underlined 
in recent experiments in `multi-stakeholder processes’ of decision-making, where it has been shown that 
`stakeholders must feel that they have access to the process, that their voices are fully heard, and that their 
participation in the deliberations is meaningful’ (Dubash et al 2001, 4). 
 
The implication is straightforward: in ensuring full accountability, transparency and disclosure are no 
substitute for direct participation and institutionalized input and monitoring in institutions. For this reason 
the presence of developing countries in each stage of policy-making in international organizations is vital.  
 
3. Policy implications 
 
This chapter began with a reflection on what global governance is failing to provide and how that failure 
impacts on people within developing countries. It analysed the limited scope for redress through existing 
mechanisms of accountability both in multilateral institutions and in the less formally accountable non-
governmental sphere of governance. From this analysis a number of policy conclusions flow.  
Accountability in global governance can be improved through the enhancement of existing mechanisms of 
transparency, monitoring and evaluation and judicial-style review. However, some larger scale reforms are 




Some advocate new international institutions. For example, many recently convened panels of eminent 
experts suggest the creation of more inter-governmental agencies to deal with issues such as environmental 
degradation, global public health, and financial and economic stability. Yet the creation of new agencies 
risks masking the reasons why existing agencies are failing - and failing developing countries in particular. 
 
Although many institutions have broad powers and purposes,  most are inadequately funded and 
anachronistically structured. As a result they are ineffective or unpopular - or indeed both. They either have 
too few resources to make any impact. Or they are accused of a new form of imperialism and of overriding 
the needs of less privileged people within developing countries. The immediate governance challenge is to 
reform existing institutions so as to make them both more effective in the provision of necessary public 
goods, and more accountable to less privileged people, especially in developing countries.  
 
What does this require? Undoubtedly in several cases this demands an increase in resources. The present 
Director-General of the WTO ruefully noted when he took over that his budget was about one third of that 
of the World Wildlife Fund. In part the argument for increased funding is based on the fact that 
international organizations can only be effective if they have resources. Unlike rulers within states, 
multilateral agencies have no legislative or enforcement powers of their own.  They compete with a variety 
of other actors and pressures in the global system. If they need to ensure cooperation among all countries in 
combatting diseases or environmental degradation, they need resources to offer assistance and incentives to 
those who can least afford to cooperate in the short-term. For this reason a number of new ways of funding 
international agencies have recently been proposed. 
 
[insert here assessment of new funding proposals from Zedillo report, Ford Foundation Report, Common 
pool approach of Kanbur et al, etc] 
 
More funding for international organizations is only one part of the solution. Another is to ensure that each 
institution is directed by its member governments to provide the most urgently needed international public 
goods, rather than expanding into less clearcut areas of global regulation and intervention. A case in point is 
the expansion of the WTO agenda into areas such as intellectual property and trade-related investment 
measures before it has achieved the more fundamental goals of balanced free trade in agriculture and 
textiles. Another is the expansion of the IMF and the World Bank into wider and deeper conditionalities 
ahead of ensuring that international mechanisms and institutions are adequate to support balanced trade and 
growth and greater stability in exchange rates and global capital markets.  
 
A further and equally important imperative is to reform representation and decision-making within the 
international institutions. Here three related issues need to be addressed: the present bias in favour of the 
powerful; inadequate representation of developing countries; and inadequate capacity on the part of many 
developing countries to contribute or to influence policy-making through informal channels.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, in many agencies there is a clear bias in favour of special interests such 
as the most powerful states and large private sector actors in both formal and informal processes and rules. 
The answer to this does not lie in greater independence of institutions through recourse to neutral `experts’ 
and the like  - precisely because, as argued above, political and economic interests cannot be abstracted out 
of global negotiations. Rather institutions need to balance the representation and participation of different 
interests and actors - and be seen to be so doing. Greater and more focussed transparency has a role to play 
here in opening up agenda-setting meetings, recording and publishing national positions and voting records 
on decisions, and ensuring access to information which is most relevant and appropriate to the needs of 
people in developing countries. Trade-offs exist here between the constructive role of NGOs and the risk 
that they represent concerned consumers, donors and activists in the industrialized countries rather than the 
interests of the less privileged in developing countries.  
 
Developing countries have often opposed the participation of NGOs, concerned that these groups eclipse 
their own role and access to institutions. Yet people in developing countries stand to gain if NGOs push for 
the kind of transparency and openness which exposes and reduces a bias against the key concerns and 
priorities of the less privileged. Here to some extent political alliances need to be forged between 
governments and NGOs with the goal of making the structures of decision-making in institutions more HDR 2002, Background Paper (first draft) by Ngaire Woods, page 25 
 
representative and more accountable to those against whom the institutions are presently biased.  Yet more 
important is the role of NGOs in holding other non-state and private sector actors in the world economy to 
account.  
 
The role of developing country governments in global governance needs to be bolstered through changes in 
formal representation. This is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition to redress the existing bias in 
international organizations. Although many organizations work by `consensus’ and say that this diminishes 
the importance of formal voting power and seats, it is worth noting that consensus decisions are always 
underpinned by the realities of power and a knowledge of which actors can veto or push final decisions. 
Consensus decision-making in reality seldom gives voice to marginalized actors (Woods 1998). 
 
What is needed is to rewrite the way in which seats and votes are allocated within international 
organizations better to recognize the stake of developing countries. This stake has changed. People in 
developing countries are no longer simply `objects’ of the international system, `collaterally’ damaged or 
improved by it. Their cooperation and commitment to implement internationally agreements is vital if any 
international organization is to succeed in managing globalization. For this reason the old rules about 
representation are no longer either viable or desirable.  Put bluntly, the Security Council, the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the WTO cannot properly do their jobs nor avoid public backlash against them if they 
remain subservient to the vetoes of those who won the second world war, or who dominate the world 
economy. The institutions must change in order to be both effective and legitimate.  
 
The old argument against increased participation and representation is that it renders decision-making more 
clumsy and unworkable. Yet we must set against this a new reality. Implementation is not possible without 
greater participation and representation. In a globalizing world key international organizations are expected 
to provide a wide range of international public goods which demand complex and deep levels of 
compliance the world over. They need people in both industrialized and developing countries to commit to 
global purposes and goals and to fashion certain kinds of action accordingly. This commitment can only be 
achieved if these same people accept the international agencies as legitimate. This does not mean that 
international institutions must or could reflect the diverse interests of every group in the world. It means 
that institutions must be seen to be taking into account a full diversity of interests and to adjudicate among 
them in a fair and just way.  
 
Others have argued that accountability in the global economy would be improved by an overarching 
institution such as an Economic and Social Security Council (variously proposed by Bertrand 1985, UNDP 
1994,  Commission on Global Governance 1995, Ul Haq 1995, Stewart and Daws 1996 and 2000) or an 
`Economic Security Council’ such as that described in the recent Zedillo Panel report to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The Zedillo panel describe a Council which `would have the same standing 
on international economic matters that the Security Council has with regard to peace and security’ (UN 
2001).  Of course, the existing Security Council is rife with its own bias in voice and representation. 
However, the Zedillo Panel propose an alternative:  a small, powerful Council comprising representatives 
from each region as well as smaller states, using the existing five UN regional economic commissions to 
elect representatives (UN 2001).  This proposal highlights a widespread dissatisfaction with the way in 
which countries are under-represented in present global economic institutions. It also points to a different 
way to structure representation in the Security Council. That said, an over-arching Council could not 
substitute for the much-needed reform of the purposes, resources and decision-making structures in each of 
the existing economic institutions. 
 
A more significant place at the table and in formal decision-making is important not only to improve the 
representativeness of international organizations. It is also a key step towards enhancing the voice of 
developing countries and the quality and influence of their input into global decision-making.  At present 
the voice of people in developing countries tends to be lost not just due to under-representation of their 
governments. It is often the case that small, poorly-resourced delegations have little time to prepare or fully 
to consider the issues of global governance at stake. It does not follow automatically that better formal 
representation resolves this (Woods 1998). However, it would increase the incentive for even small and 
under-resourced countries to prepare and take seriously the positions they advance and the interests they 
represent in international organizations.  
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the status quo seldom support change even where there is a good longer-run rationale.  However, in 
negotiating for change, there are several elements of any international organization `package’ which can be 
put on the table and negotiated as part of reform. These include not just the allocation of seats in the 
governing body of the organization and voting and veto powers within it but also: the location of the 
headquarters and other parts of the organization (which carry many spin-off advantages); the selection of 
the head; the selection of other senior management posts; decision-making rules for different categories of 
decisions (e.g. constitutional, strategic and operational decisions); and finally, the financial structure of the 






Global governance stands accused of being unaccountable and deaf to the world’s diversity of peoples and 
issues. The accusation is not altogether unfounded. This chapter has described a web of governance 
comprising multilateral institutions, private sector networks, inter-state networks and coalitions, and 
bilateral and regional arrangements. It portrays a system in which the underlying power and hierarchy of 
states and the most powerful transnational corporations is unavoidable, even (or even especially) in the so-
called technical, expert arrangements to which policy-makers seem increasingly attracted.  
For some, the solution is to democratize global governance either from the bottom-up or from the top-
down. Political theorists have long argued that globalization or growing interdependence presents an 
opportunity - if not the need - to establish a more global democracy, or at the very least to enshrine human 
rights and some form of global redistribution as a corner-stone of global governance (Beitz 1979, Doyle 
1997).  In recent debates we see this in arguments for `mainstreaming human rights’ and for implementing 
a universal set of moral values - a `law of peoples’ - and a clear set of principles regarding the nature and 
composition of international institutions (Held 2001, HDR). The problem faced by proponents of these 
proposed goals is the lack of legitimate institutions and instruments with which to promulgate them. The 
rise of yet less accountable forms of global governance highlighted in this paper further compounds the 
problem. 
 
This chapter argues instead for more focus on the existing processes of global governance and to whom 
they are accountable. It proposes a number of ways to enhance the capacity of people in developing 
countries to hold international institutions to account. These include specific kinds of transparency and 
monitoring, a strengthening of legal forms of redress against international actors, and enhanced overall 
participation for developing countries. All these forms of accountability rely to some degree on non-
governmental organizations, both transnational and local. In this regard, people and governments in 
developing countries have every interest in monitoring the transnational NGO community to ensure not just 
that developing countries are not marginalized in `global civil society’, but equally that strategic alliances 
are forged where possible with transnational NGOs to promulgate and enhance greater accountability to 
people in developing countries.  
 
More fundamentally, the chapter calls for rewriting the constitutions of major international organizations so 
as to make them more representative, more accountable to those they affect, and more effective. If 
developing countries are given a more genuine `seat at the table’ they will have more scope to speak and 
more incentive to enhance the quality of their input and influence in global governance. The advantages of 
this will accrue to more than developing countries. Worldwide protests have underscored the perception 
that global governance is biased in favour of particular groups and that international institutions are unfair 
in the way they adjudicate among competing interests.  The onus is now on policy-makers to increase 
confidence in institutions by making them more genuinely representative, more clearly and effectively 
accountable, and more equitable in the way they trade-off different interests in decision-making. A 
focussed and timely set of reforms could foster the confidence and commitment of people in both 
industrialized and developing countries alike, in itself a pre-requisite if the institutions are more effectively 
to provide the international public goods necessary for global growth, security and stability. 
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